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1. COLLINGWOOD AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

R.G. Collingwood is not normally associated with analytic philosophy,
neither negatively nor positively. He neither regarded himself, nor was
regarded by his contemporaries and their successors, as an analytical
philosopher. However, the story is more interestingly complex than
this, both because Collingwood is one of the few pre-analytics in the
UK who continues to be of interest to current analytical philosophers,
especially in relation to the philosophy of art and history and his conception of metaphysics, and because he mounted a critique of analytical
philosophy in the years of its emergence.
Although Collingwood is frequently labelled an idealist, this misrepresents both his position and his own self-perception. Indeed, it was
only ever with great reluctance that R.G. Collingwood accepted any
philosophical label, whether ‘idealist’ or ‘Hegelian’: he always preferred
to think of himself as beating his own philosophical path. In his Autobiography Collingwood claims that there was never an ‘Hegelian’ school
in Oxford:
When I began to read philosophy there in 1910, Oxford
was still obsessed by what I will call the school of Green . . .
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The philosophical tendencies common to this school were
described by its contemporary opponents as Hegelianism.
This title was repudiated by the school itself, and rightly . . .
Green had read Hegel in youth, but rejected him in middle
age . . . Bradley . . . knew enough of Hegel to be certain
that he disagreed with his cardinal doctrines (Collingwood
1939: 15-16).
As for Collingwood himself, he was brought up in Oxford as a realist
in the tradition of Cook Wilson, his tutor at University College being E.F.
Carritt. Later, under the influence of the Italian idealists Croce, Gentile
and De Ruggiero, he moved towards a form of idealism, and this phase
culminated in the production of Speculum Mentis in 1924. In that work
we find something akin to a Hegelian phenomenology, modified by reflection on Italian philosophy. In Speculum Mentis Collingwood identifies art, religion, science, history and philosophy as the forms of experience. This corresponds in part to Hegel’s trio where art, religion and
philosophy comprise absolute spirit. But the exact sequence maps more
accurately onto Gentile’s absolute forms of the spirit, which take the
form of a triad consisting of art, religion and knowledge. Collingwood
takes the triad, retains art and religion and divides knowledge into three
moments. In his modified scheme, art is the subjective or imaginative
and ‘supposing’ moment; religion is the objective or ‘assertive’ moment;
within knowledge, the subjective or questioning is science; the objective
or answering moment is history; and the absolute synthesis is philosophy.1 But Collingwood saw no need to worry his readers with the detail
of his influences:
by greatly adding to the bulk of this volume I could easily have pointed out the affinities of my position with that
of eminent writers past and present, and so, perhaps, have
recommended it to readers who rightly shrink from any philosophy which is advertised as new. If I have consistently
refrained from doing this it is only because I want my position to stand on its merits rather than on names of great
men cited as witnesses for its defence. But if the reader
feels that my thesis reminds him of things that other people
have said, I shall not be disappointed: on the contrary, what
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will really disappoint me is to be treated as the vendor of
new-fangled paradoxes and given some silly name like that
of ‘New Idealist’ (Collingwood 1924: 12-13).
Or for that matter ‘old idealist’. But in private he didn’t appear to
mind so much about these labels; indeed, he remarked to De Ruggiero
that ‘I now find that Speculum Mentis is exciting a good deal of attention
. . . and is regarded as possibly opening a new movement in English
philosophy. People, intending praise, say as T.H. Green was to Kant and
Hegel, so is R.G.C to Croce! And Gentile!’2
One of the founders of the analytic school in Britain was L. Susan
Stebbing, with whom Collingwood had a couple of early skirmishes.
She reviewed both Speculum Mentis and Outlines of a Philosophy of Art
(1925) and later, in 1940, An Essay on Metaphysics. In Speculum Mentis
Collingwood had remarked that ‘to suppose that one word, in whatever context it appears, ought to mean one thing and no more, argues
not an exceptionally high standard of logical accuracy but an exceptional ignorance as to the nature of language’ (Collingwood 1924: 11).
This prompted Stebbing to riposte that ‘presumably, to expect that such
important words as true, identical, real should have a clear and unambiguous meaning, is to be a “verbal pedant” who uses “jargon” that
is neither English nor “plain.” The critic is thus given to understand
at the outset that he must not expect precision of statement whether
or not there be clearness of thought’ (Stebbing 1924: 567). This indicates a fundamental difference in their views of meaning and language,
something that reappeared in later disputes with Gilbert Ryle and Curt
Ducasse.
Collingwood published An Essay on Philosophical Method in 1933,
the year of the founding of the journal Analysis. In the Essay he criticised the failure of the analytical school to address the issue of their own
presuppositions (Collingwood 2005, Ch. VII). He argues that the methods and procedures of the analytic school rest on unacknowledged and
unanalysed presuppositions. He suggests, further, that it leaves nothing
for philosophy to do: by comparison with critical philosophy, which at
least had the function of controverting error, analytic philosophy has
only:
. . . the task of analysing the knowledge we already possess: taking the propositions which are given by science
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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and common sense, and revealing their logical structure or
‘showing what exactly we mean when we say’, for example,
that there is a material world. . . . If a person holding a
view of this type were asked to state his philosophical position, he would probably begin by stating a series of propositions belonging to the sphere of common sense . . . the
task of philosophy, on this view, is to analyse such propositions as these; and consequently a philosopher holding this
view would presumably describe as part of his philosophical position not only the data of analysis, the propositions
of common sense . . . but the results of analysis . . . But the
analytic view of philosophy implies a third class of propositions: neither the data of analysis . . . nor its results . . .
but the principles according to which it proceeds; some of
them logical . . . some metaphysical. The analytic philosopher, invited to state his philosophical position, would perhaps include in the statement propositions of all these three
classes. But, on such a view of philosophy, it is not quite
clear that data, results, and principles have an equal right
to be included. The data of analysis are only the subjectmatter upon which philosophical thought exercises itself . . .
to think of it as an element in his philosophical position is
to relapse into that very view of philosophy as criticizing
or corroborating common sense against which this theory is
expressly in revolt. The results of analysis would seem to be
in the same case. For the analysis of a common-sense proposition states what exactly that proposition means; and if
the datum of analysis is a common-sense proposition, its result, being identical with it in meaning, is a common-sense
proposition also (Collingwood 2005: 142-4).
There is, however, one class of propositions that ought to be included
but generally is not, namely what Collingwood has referred to as the
‘third class of propositions. . . which comprises the principles on which
analysis proceeds’.
These principles constitute a theory concerning the nature
and method of philosophy; this is a philosophical theory,
and a constructive one; and, therefore . . . it is clear that
Vol. 4: 200 Years of Analytical Philosophy
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his first duty is to expound these. Yet he, like the critical
philosopher, not only neglects this duty but makes a merit
of neglecting it and asserting that he has no constructive or
systematic theory of his own (Collingwood 2005: 144-5).
He goes on to remark that some, Susan Stebbing in her article on the
‘The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics’, for example, have started to
remedy this defect. She has reminded us that the method has been
used for over twenty years, but that no one has ‘seen fit to raise’ the
issue. Stebbing has attempted to state these principles, but admits that
‘nearly all the great philosophers of the past’ have implicitly denied
them, (Stebbing 1933: 66) and makes no attempt to rebut these denials or offer reasons why the assumptions should be granted. Collingwood concludes that analytical philosophy rests upon principles which
constitute a constructive philosophical position:
But a great part of the attraction of the analytic method
lies in its claim to have done away with the old idea of
constructive philosophy; and the only comment which can
now be made on that claim is that analytic philosophy does
indeed involve a constructive philosophical doctrine, but,
true to its character as a form of scepticism, declines the
task of stating it (Collingwood 2005: 146).
As always, although under different terms and guises, Collingwood demands the clear enunciation of underlying principles and castigates his
philosophical opponents for failing to give an account of theirs, or even
for seeking to deny their existence. As will become apparent later, this
is also the essence of his attack on logical positivism.
2. SKIRMISHES WITH RYLE AND DUCASSE

Eighteen months after the publication of Collingwood’s An Essay on
Philosophical Method, Gilbert Ryle launched in Mind a critique of the
central contention of the chapter on ‘Philosophy as Categorical Thinking’, which consisted in saying that there was a specific philosophical
sense in which the ontological argument held true: the sense that, as
subject and object coincide in philosophical thought, to think philosophically is to prove the existence of the object of philosophical thought. Alwww.thebalticyearbook.org
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though Collingwood was at pains to distinguish this claim from the traditional ontological argument in which it is held to prove the existence
of God, his use of the term was provocative and unnecessary in establishing the rather limited claim he wished to make, which was merely
that philosophical reasoning is self-reflexive in the sense that its propositions must also apply to itself: in philosophy one cannot step outside
reason. Ryle objected both to what he saw as an anachronistic and
perverse resurrection of the ontological argument - which (in his view)
wilfully flew in the face of modern developments in logic - and to the
lesser claim that philosophical claims and statements were also about
themselves. I shall not pursue this here, but confine myself to a few
remarks on the related dispute over the nature of language.3 Collingwood resists the view that language consists in definitions, that is, the
claim that language is essentially technical in origin. Technical definition presupposes language rather than grounds it. A related claim is
that technical language in philosophy is undesirable and best avoided:
The duty of the philosopher as a writer is therefore to avoid
the technical vocabulary proper to science, and to choose
his words according to the rules of literature. His terminology must have that expressiveness, that flexibility, that
dependence upon context, which are the hallmarks of a literary use of words as opposed to a technical use of symbols
Collingwood 2005: 207).
The Ryle–Collingwood correspondence took place in 1935, at the stage
of Ryle’s career when he subscribed to a view of language dominated by
the idea of an ideal language and a denotational theory of meaning according to which all statements have meaning in the same way, namely
the way in which ‘Fido’ means Fido (the dog). In this theory words
and sentences are treated as names. Collingwood was never, whether
in his earlier or later writings, under the spell of either an ideal language or the denotational theory of meaning. His view of language in
fact bore similarities to that adopted by the later Wittgenstein and the
later Ryle, but at the time of these early skirmishes both adhered to the
denotational view and the assumption that language should strive for a
sort of ‘scientific’ accuracy. Collingwood thought the latter to be at once
impossible and misplaced in philosophy.
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The same issues arose in Collingwood’s quarrel with Curt Ducasse.
In 1931 Collingwood reviewed The Philosophy of Art, in which Ducasse
expresses his wish to avoid ‘the vagueness and logical looseness which
have been the bane of philosophy’ – a comment which Collingwood
quotes in his review. Ducasse, when he came to review An Essay on
Philosophical Method a few years later, accuses Collingwood of inaccuracy and looseness, arguing that his attack on the technical theory of
language was wrong, and that Collingwood’s claim that in the case of
philosophical concepts coordinate species overlap was based on a simple failure to understand the term ‘coordinate species’. In Ducasse’s
view, given that the definition of coordinate species logically excludes
the possibility of overlap, Collingwood is either wrong in his claim about
overlap, or he is surreptitiously relying for his examples on what is true
for non-coordinate species whilst claiming that the results hold for coordinate species.4
3. AN ESSAY ON METAPHYSICS AS A RESPONSE TO
LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC

The emergence of logical positivism constituted a full frontal onslaught
on Collingwood’s philosophical position; further, it emerged at the moment he was elected to the Waynflete Chair in Metaphysical Philosophy.
How did he respond?
In Part of My Life, A.J. Ayer provides anecdotal evidence of Collingwood’s attitude towards logical positivism, evidence showing both that
he understood the significance of the new movement, and the extent to
which he opposed it:
Gilbert Ryle told me that on a visit to Blackwell’s he had
overheard Prichard and Joseph saying that it was scandalous that the book had found a publisher. This does not
imply that they had read it. Collingwood, who happened
also to be in the shop, turned to them and said ‘Gentlemen,
this book will be read when your names are forgotten.’ I
suspect that this was less a tribute to me than an expression
of his contempt for them. He did, however, take the book
seriously enough to devote part of his lectures to refuting
it. He ended one lecture by saying, ‘If I thought Mr Ayer
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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was right, I would give up philosophy.’ When the audience
arrived for the next lecture, they were startled to find that
it had been cancelled. The story ends lamely: he had been
stricken with influenza (Ayer 1977: 166).
Of course Collingwood was right in his assessment of the fortunes of
Prichard and Joseph: they remained virtually unheard of for many
years (although Prichard’s influence on Austin and others should not
be under-estimated). It might be remarked, though, that Prichard is
now returning to notice (together with W.D. Ross) under the aegis of
the renewed interest in intuitionism and particularism in ethics.
An Essay in Metaphysics can be seen to be an attempt to show that
on Ayer’s own principles logical positivism had to accept the existence
of certain entities whose existence it officially denied. Without relying
on discredited philosophical authorities or on the voice of its opponents,
he sought to mount an attack showing that logical positivism contained
the seeds of its own destruction, just as he had earlier sought to show
that the analytical school had failed to account for the principles on
which it rested.
The genesis of An Essay on Metaphysics owes much to the influence
on Collingwood of three factors: his election to the Waynflete Professorship; the work of Ayer and Michael Foster; and his studies in anthropology, philosophy of history, and the history of science. He was acutely
aware of the different modes of thought and feeling of people separated in both time and space. Collingwood found himself in a position
in which his own heightened sensitivity to the history and variability of
basic concepts in science and civilization coincided with an especially
ferocious attack on metaphysics at the moment he became Professor of
Metaphysics. It is hardly fanciful to suppose that these factors, taken together, both prompted the writing of An Essay on Metaphysics and also
influenced the general shape and character of its content and argument.
Foster’s work perhaps shaped or reinforced some of Collingwood’s own
views; Ayer’s provoked Collingwood to articulate them forcefully.
Foster was propounding views arguing for both the inescapability of
fundamental presuppositions in scientific work and the close relationship between these presuppositions and Christianity (see Foster 1934);
Ayer, in contrast, was engaged (in a paper which appeared in the preceding issue of Mind) in a ‘Demonstration of the Impossibility of Meta-
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physics’. Collingwood took Ayer’s challenge to metaphysics (and, by
extension, the possibility of himself professing what he was paid to profess) seriously. But how was he to rebut it? One can imagine him
reading the volume of Mind containing Foster’s and Ayer’s articles and
seeing one as the answer to the other. But despite his substantial agreement with Foster, he chose to adopt a fresh strategy and argue the case
from a different angle.
His strategy was to accept much of Ayer’s argument, but to argue
that something important is left standing after Ayer’s demolition experts have done their work. What? ‘Absolute presuppositions’ is the
answer. The next step (although not a necessary step – the force of
the argument against Ayer is unaffected by the label) was to christen
the activity of elucidating and articulating them ‘metaphysics’. If this
seemed a little thin, the argument could be bolstered with historical
examples and strong claims for the centrality within natural science of
those presuppositions. This is exactly what he encountered in Foster’s
articles where we find the unearthing of presuppositions, the claim that
natural science is possible only on the basis of absolute presuppositions
which cannot be justified by science itself, together with a tracing of
the process by which these presuppositions emerged historically in the
context of Christian belief and practice. From the conjunction of Ayer’s
negative criticism, Collingwood’s determination to show that something
can be salvaged for metaphysics, and Foster’s articles, emerges An Essay
of Metaphysics.5
Collingwood’s first draft of the Essay was The Function of Metaphysics
in Civilization (1937-8). That it was written in response to Ayer is clear:
. . . (this is a point at which the logical positivists are right)
there is no possible method of verifying a metaphysical proposition. For any verification is a process resting on presuppositions; hence presuppositions as such can never be verified. The logical positivists, of course, draw the wrong conclusion from this. Confusing the case of a proposition which
needs verification and fails to get it with the case of a proposition which doesn’t get it because owing to its function
in the structure of thought it can’t need it, they infer that
metaphysical propositions being unverifiable are nonsense.
From this the right inference would be that since metaphys-
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ical propositions are presupposed by all our ordinary thinking, all our ordinary thinking is nonsensical too; but they
don’t draw that inference because they completely fail to
understand the nature of metaphysics (Collingwood 1998:
408-9).
Two observations are pertinent here. First, that Collingwood is right
to claim that absolute presuppositions are not like normal propositions
whose truth can be verified or demonstrated in a straightforward way.
This is because they do not stand within our everyday thought but
rather constitute the boundary of that thought; as such, the methods for
determining truth and falsehood which apply to everyday propositions
do not apply to them. Secondly, Collingwood is quite clearly restricting
the term ‘true’ to ‘what can be verified’. This is because Collingwood
accepted Ayer’s verification principle for the sake of argument (Collingwood 1998: 165). Thus, in the Essay on Metaphysics the terms ‘truth’
and ‘falsity’ mean no more than ‘what can or cannot be empirically verified’, and this is a concession to Ayer’s verification principle. But his
agreement with Ayer does not signify acceptance of all of Ayer’s conclusions. His concern, on the contrary, is to show that, even granted
Ayer’s verification principle, metaphysics is still both possible and necessary and that if we deny the existence of absolute presuppositions we
deny the very grounds of our own thinking. He is arguing that a class
of meaningful statements exists which are neither analytically true nor
empirically verifiable. Thus, if the term ‘true statement’ means one that
is empirically verifiable, the conclusion must follow that absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false. Ayer, of course, regards them as
meaningless; Collingwood does not. However, given that he adopts this
approach for the sake of argument in the course of his polemic against
Ayer and others, and that what he is essentially drawing attention to is
the different roles that absolute presuppositions and empirically verifiable propositions play in our thought, we should not go on to conclude
that there is no possible sense in which absolute presuppositions can be
true. The only conclusion we can validly draw is that, if the term ‘true’
is restricted in this way, they cannot be true, but that, if the restrictions
are removed, they can be true or false – but their truth or falsity has
to be established in a different way than that of empirically verifiable
propositions.
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When he came to write the final version of An Essay on Metaphysics
in 1938-9, Collingwood’s thought had developed a little further. The
main difference is that unlike in his earlier formulation he devises an
entirely new argument for the existence of absolute presuppositions,
one first adumbrated in An Autobiography. This is the argument from
question and answer. Here he argues that every statement is the answer to a question and that each question presupposes the answer to a
previous question. However, if one probes deeply enough, one reaches
a presupposition which is not a relative presupposition, but an absolute
presupposition in that it is not the answer to any question.
By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition and relatively
to another question as its answer. ... An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to
which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer
(Collingwood 1998: 29, 31).
Absolute presuppositions are not derived from experience, but something we bring to experience in the ‘conversion of it into science and
civilization’ (Collingwood 1998: 197). Hence, they have a special place
in our thinking and cannot be ‘proved’ or ‘verified’ according to an external criterion or test. What he terms ‘relative presuppositions’ are answers to questions and can be verified. They are ‘normal’ propositions;
absolute presuppositions, by contrast, because they are not answers to
questions at all, but rather what makes the activity of questioning possible, cannot be characterised as true or false in the way those terms
apply to normal propositions. The distinctive feature of absolute presuppositions is marked by insisting that they are not really propositions
at all. They are what must be presupposed in formulating propositions:
We do not acquire absolute presuppositions by arguing; on
the contrary, unless we have them already arguing is impossible to us. Nor can we change them by arguing; unless they
remained constant all our arguments would fall to pieces.
We cannot confirm ourselves in them by ‘proving’ them; it
is proof that depends on them, not they on proof (Collingwood 1998: 173).6
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criticism: that is another enterprise, and mine here is simply to indicate
Collingwood’s response to logical positivism, not to defend it.7 So let
me demonstrate the truth of my claim that his response was governed
by tactics by considering his other activities over the same period. In
An Essay on Metaphysics Collingwood stepped outside the shield of his
philosophical affinities to defend them from attack; but he was still
active behind the scenes in promoting the cause – an impression which
one would never gain from a straight reading of the Essay.
4.

BEHIND THE SCENES: HEGEL

A corollary of Collingwood’s response to the rise of analytical philosophy and its offshoots and allies is that after Speculum Mentis (1924) he
ceased to use idealist language. Whether he should ultimately be characterised as an idealist or not, or whether he was an idealist in his early
career and ceased to be one later, is another matter. What is clear, however, is that his language changed and that the later published writings
contain little of the idealist terminology he used until 1925. For example, there is no reference to ‘spirit’ in published writings after 1925,
although he continued to use the term in private manuscripts for another ten years. Again, in An Essay on Philosophical Method he does not
use the terms ‘dialectic’ (except in referring to others), ‘concrete universal’, or the ‘absolute’. Whether reviewers were right to praise it as
‘one of the finest restatements in contemporary British philosophy of a
Platonic and Hegelian metaphysic viewed from a modern standpoint’
or not, his language was certainly not out of that stable (Knox 1933).
In my view this was partly a tactical abstention from a language that
would have been unhelpful and misunderstood in the new philosophical discourse of the 1930s, and partly serious dissatisfaction with the
language he had inherited.
Despite his reluctance to use the language of idealism publicly, Collingwood was privately active in promoting the study of Hegel (to take
but one example). In 1933 he wrote a detailed and sympathetic report for the Clarendon Press on Foster’s Political Philosophies of Plato
and Hegel (1935). A few years later he took a close interest in G. R.
G. Mure’s work on Hegel. This large volume, following Collingwood’s
suggestions, was published as two separate volumes: An Introduction

It is not my intention here to defend Collingwood’s position against
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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to Hegel (1940) and A Study of Hegel’s Logic (1950). In his report he
commented that:
The book is a very fine one . . . Mure is a first rate man, and
let us not forget it. His introduction will make a magnificent
separate book under that name. I have read all the introductions to Hegel in all the ordinary languages (if there are
any in Hungarian or Russian I haven’t read them) and this
is far the best. It doesn’t pot Hegel, it illuminates him.8
A year later, in May 1940, Collingwood acted as the champion for
Knox’s translation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. He wrote to Knox that
‘of your enclosures I have only read the Hegel paper: you can guess
with what delighted approval. J.A. Smith (God rest his soul) used to
declaim against the habit of treating Hegel as a dead dog. Carritt is
a deeply-dyed offender. You have done justice to him.’9 On seeing a
draft of the translation in 1938, he suggested in correspondence with
the Press that the Zusätze be retained as they ‘are regarded as of great
importance by all Hegel devotees.’ Later, writing to Kenneth Sisam at
the Clarendon Press, Knox wrote that:
In a formal and official letter I have avoided mentioning
Collingwood’s name, but I may tell you privately that he has
been interested in this project and that I have had several
conversations with him about it. In particular, he is the
Delegate who has advised me to submit the thing again now
and not to hide it, as I had intended to do, until the war was
over. . . . it is no secret that Collingwood is much more of a
Hegelian scholar than Ross is . . . .10

R.G. Collingwood, Analytical Philosophy and Logical Positivism

14

on philosophical authorities of whatever provenance. He attempted to
mount independent critiques of analytical philosophy and logical positivism and to develop his own arguments. In so doing he carved out
for himself an area of philosophical independence and thereby ensured
that his work continues to be read despite the exigencies of philosophical fashion.
Notes
1

See H.S Harris’s introduction to G. Gentile, Genesis and Structure of Society, p.18.
Letter to de Ruggiero, November 16th 1924.
3
For a full account, see the editors’ introduction to Collingwood 2005.
4
According to standard Aristotelian logic, it is simply an axiom that the coordinate
species of a genus are mutually exclusive. See, for example, (Parry & Hacker 1991: 1312) where they state in their discussion of logical division that ‘Coordinate classes must
be mutually exclusive; The coordinate classes must be jointly coextensive with the class
they divide; Each stage of a division should be based upon one principle of division.’ On
this basis, to assert that coordinate species overlap is either to speak nonsense or to have
misidentified the species.
5
He later published ‘Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature’ in two parts
(1935-6).
6
Collingwood gives various examples of absolute presuppositions. They include ‘all
events have a cause’, the principle of the continuity of nature in time and space, the
existence of God, the principle that mathematics is applicable to the natural world and
hence that natural science is essentially an applied mathematics, and so on. Copious
examples may be found throughout both An Essay on Metaphysics and The Idea of Nature.
7
See Connelly 2003.
8
Letter to the Clarendon Press, 16th June 1939.
9
Letter to T.M. Knox, 6th January 1940. The paper referred to is ‘Hegel and Prussianism’.
10
Letter to the Clarendon Press, 15th March 1940.
2
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